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ARTICLE

Using Building Codes to Rewrite the
Tailoring Rule and Mitigate Climate Change
ALBERT MONROE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2007, in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency (Mass. v. EPA),1 the Supreme Court ruled that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had authority under the
Clean Air Act (CAA) to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs), which include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
and fluorinated gases.2 GHGs trap excess heat in the atmosphere
and cause climate change.3 On December 7, 2009, the EPA
Administrator found that GHGs “may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare” due to their contribution to
climate change, triggering EPA regulation of GHG emissions
from cars and trucks (mobile sources) under the CAA.4
The EPA’s endangerment finding also requires the EPA to
regulate GHGs from stationary sources under the CAA.5
Stationary sources are defined in the CAA as “any building,
*The author would like to thank everyone who read this paper and gave
their comments, including Douglas Kysar (Yale Law School), Michael Livermore
(NYU School of Law), Michael Lewyn (Touro Law Center), and Victor Flatt
(University of North Carolina School of Law).
1. 549 U.S. 497, 498 (2007).
2. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Greenhouse Gases Overview, EPA,
http://epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases.html (last updated Aug. 31,
2012).
3. Id.
4. Endangerment Findings for GHGs, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,505 (Dec. 15,
2009).
5. See discussion infra Part II.
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structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air
pollutant.”6 The CAA states that any new or existing stationary
source that emits more than either 100 or 250 tons per year (tpy)
of regulated pollutants requires a permit.7 Millions of stationary
sources, mostly buildings, emit more than 100 tpy of carbon
dioxide.8
According to the EPA, the plain language of the CAA would
cause six million stationary sources (mostly commercial and
residential buildings) to need operating permits.9 Currently, only
about 15,000 sources already have operating permits for other
types of air pollution under the CAA.10 In the EPA’s estimation,
requiring permits from six million stationary sources would cost
permitting authorities (federal and state governments) $22.5
billion annually, instead of the $105 million cost of requiring
permits from only the largest polluters, similar to current
practice.11 Most single family houses would be exempt from CAA
regulation of GHG emissions; a typical household only emits
about 13.5 tpy of carbon dioxide, measured in carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO2e).12 However, larger buildings for commercial,
industrial, and residential use would be regulated and therefore
require permits.
The Obama Administration promulgated the Tailoring Rule
in June 2010 to greatly reduce the cost to permitting agencies and

6. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2006).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2006) (Prevention of Significant Deterioration);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2006) (Title V).
8. EPA, Final Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule: Fact Sheet, 1 (May 13, 2010),
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20100413fs.pdf.
9. EPA, Operating Permits Burden Reductions With and Without the
Tailoring Rule (May 13, 2010), http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/
20100413piecharts.pdf [hereinafter Operating Permits Burden].
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Household Emissions Calculator Assumptions and References, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/ind-assumptions.html
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2012). Methane, nitrous oxide, and fluoridated gases are more
powerful greenhouse gases than carbon dioxide. Greenhouse gas emissions are
measured in terms of total climate change potential, otherwise known as units
of carbon dioxide (hence carbon dioxide equivalent).
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the number of permits required.13 The Tailoring Rule limits
regulation of GHG emissions from stationary sources to sources
that emit at least 100,000 tpy CO2e, or emit at least 100,000 tpy
CO2e and undertake a modification that increases GHG emissions
by at least 75,000 tpy CO2e.14
Industry groups and states opposed to the Tailoring Rule
filed suit against the EPA to get the Tailoring Rule vacated.
These cases were consolidated in the D.C. Circuit under Coalition
for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA.15 The D.C. Circuit did
not evaluate the lawfulness of the Tailoring Rule on the merits;
instead, the court stated that none of the petitioners had standing
because the Tailoring Rule would help them, not harm them, by
reducing the cost of complying with the CAA.16 Therefore, the
petitioners suffered no injury-in-fact and did not have standing to
challenge the Tailoring Rule.17
The combination of Mass. v. EPA and the CAA gives the EPA
three plausible paths to regulate GHG emissions from buildings.
The EPA can:
(1) follow the plain language of the CAA and require
millions of buildings (and other sources of GHG
emissions) to get individualized permits–costing
permitting agencies $22.5 billion;18
(2) regulate fewer buildings on an individualized basis–the
Tailoring Rule does this and only costs permitting
agencies $105 million, instead of $22.5 billion.19
However, the Tailoring Rule leaves millions of
buildings unregulated that the CAA and Mass. v. EPA
imply should be regulated. The EPA instead could:
(3) regulate millions of buildings on a general (not
individualized) basis, issuing regulations for certain
types of buildings, rather than for each individual
building.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010).
Id.; see also discussion infra Part III.a.
684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 146.
Id.
Operating Permits Burden, supra note 9.
Id.
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In this paper, I propose that the EPA regulate buildings emitting
more than 100 or 250 tpy CO2e by forcing states to enact more
energy-efficient building codes for those buildings.
Furthermore, in this paper I show that my proposal is legally
sound while the Tailoring Rule is legally suspect. In general,
federal courts force administrative agencies to regulate all
entities that congressional statutes state they must regulate.
This suggests that the EPA cannot refuse to regulate buildings
that emit more than 100 or 250, and less than 100,000, tpy CO2e
as the EPA does in its Tailoring Rule. Instead, the EPA should
forego the case-by-case regulatory approach normally mandated
in the CAA for a more manageable approach that regulates all
mandated buildings, but does so through more energy-efficient
building codes.
Using building codes to regulate buildings is also good policy.
The savings from better building design; heating, ventilation, and
cooling systems (HVAC); and insulation usually pay for
themselves in energy savings. Market failures, especially for
buildings that are not owner-occupied, cause buildings to expend
more energy than they would in an efficient market.
Part II describes regulation of GHG emissions under the
CAA. Part III discusses why the Tailoring Rule is legally suspect.
Part IV describes the legal implications of using building codes to
regulate GHG emissions under the CAA. Part V shows why
using building codes to regulate GHG emissions is good policy.
Part VI concludes.
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Mass. v. EPA and the language of the CAA forced the EPA to
regulate GHG emissions. Under the CAA, an “air pollutant” is
defined as “any air pollution agent . . . which is emitted into . . .
the ambient air.”20 In Mass. v. EPA, the Supreme Court declared
that GHGs, including carbon dioxide, were air pollutants under
the CAA.21 Under the CAA, the EPA is required to regulate
emissions of any “air pollutant” which in the “judgment” of the

20. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006).
21. 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
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EPA Administrator “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.”22 After Mass. v. EPA and years of studies detailing the
potential harms of climate change, it was clear that the EPA
would have to find that GHG emissions “endanger[] public health
or welfare.”23 In 2009, the EPA made its endangerment finding
and GHG emissions came under CAA regulation.24
The EPA’s endangerment finding triggered several types of
CAA regulation:
● New Source Performance Standards (NSPS);
● Performance standards for existing sources;
● Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD); and
● Title V permitting requirements.
I describe each of these in turn.
NSPS for stationary sources are mandated in section 111 of
the CAA.25
NSPS are EPA-imposed emission control
requirements. Under this section, the EPA imposes emission
control requirements for categories of emitters that “cause[], or
contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”26 NSPS are
the best demonstrated technology for reducing emission from that
category of sources, taking into account the costs of imposing such

22. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (mobile sources); 42 U.S.C. §
7411(b)(1)(A) (2006) (stationary sources, including buildings).
23. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), IPCC
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 (2007) (detailing how GHG
emissions endanger public health and welfare); see also Letter from Lisa P.
Jackson, Adm’r, EPA, to Jay Rockefeller, U.S. Senator (Feb. 22, 2010) (“As a
result of the Court’s decision, EPA became obligated to treat greenhouse-gas
emissions as air pollution under the Clean Air Act and to engage with the best
available science in determining whether those emission endanger Americans’
health or welfare.”).
24. Endangerment Findings for GHGs, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009)
(final rule).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006). Note that these provisions apply to GHGs
because there is no National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for GHGs.
If the EPA were to classify GHGs as criteria pollutants, then 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409,
7410 (2006) would apply instead.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
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controls.27 These controls must be adopted by new and modified
sources in the relevant categories.28
Recently, the EPA promulgated proposed GHG emissions
standards for new power plants.29 The power plant NSPS for
GHGs is such that natural gas power plants can meet the
standard, but new coal plants cannot without carbon capture and
storage.30
Section 111 also requires the EPA to issue guidelines to
states for the creation of standards for existing sources for which
NSPS have been promulgated.31 States then must develop the
equivalent of State Implementation Plans (SIPs) which establish
and impose emission standards for existing sources similar to
those the EPA sets for new and modified sources.32 In applying
these standards to any given source, the state may “take into
consideration, among other factors, the remaining useful life of
the existing source to which such standard applies.”33 If a state
fails to adopt an NSPS plan that meets EPA approval, the EPA
must impose its own NSPS plan.34
Major sources of air pollution are governed by the PSD
provisions of the CAA.35 PSD defines major sources as those that
emit or have the potential to emit 250 tpy of a regulated pollutant
(100 tpy of several specified types, none of which are likely to
apply to buildings).36 Under PSD, new or modified major sources
must adopt specified emissions controls–“best available control
technology” (BACT). BACT is defined as:
27. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (defining standards of performance).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1).
29. Standards of Performance for GHGs for New Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012).
30. EPA, EPA Fact Sheet: Proposed Carbon Pollution Standard for New
Power Plants, 2 (Mar. 27, 2012), http://epa.gov/carbonpollutionstandard/pdfs/
20120327factsheet.pdf; see also George Peridas, EPA’s New Power Plant Rule –
How Does It Affect Coal-Fired Power Generation, SWITCHBOARD (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/gperidas/epas_new_power_plant_rule_-_ho.
html.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(B).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (2006).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2006).
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[A]n emission limitation based on the maximum degree of
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this
chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting
facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts
and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through
application of production processes and available methods,
systems, and techniques . . . .37

Sources subject to PSD must file permits to demonstrate
regulatory compliance.38 These permits must be approved on a
case-by-case basis, making sure that the particular source
complies with permit requirements.39
All sources that emit or have the potential to emit 100 tpy of
a regulated pollutant are required to obtain Title V permits under
the CAA.40
These permits require fees to the permitting
authority and are limited to five years. 41 Title V permits have a
long list of requirements, including enforceable emissions
limitations, a schedule of compliance, and self-monitoring.42
Very few facilities currently have to submit PSD and Title V
permit applications. Today, about 280 sources require PSD
permits each year for either new construction or modifications.43
Under the plain language of the CAA, the EPA estimates that
almost 41,000 new and modified sources would require PSD
permits, and millions of existing sources would require Title V
permits.44
GHGs, especially carbon dioxide, are emitted at much higher
volumes than other air pollutants because other pollutants come
from impurities in the fossil fuel burned, or incomplete

37. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006). The permitting authorities are usually state – or
local – level authorities, although the EPA can retain or recapture such
authority at the federal level if states do not conform to federal standards. See
40 C.F.R. pt. 70 (2012), for standards state permitting programs must follow.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7475.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a (2006).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) (2006).
43. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,535 (June 3, 2010).
44. Id.
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combustion.45 But carbon dioxide is one of the core results of
combustion, and is therefore emitted at very high volumes.46 The
result is that many, many sources are considered major sources
for GHG emissions, while very few sources are major sources for
emissions of other air pollutants.
The cost of regulating GHG emissions from buildings under
the CAA would be extremely high, both for permitting authorities
and for owners of regulated buildings. The EPA estimates that
the compliance cost of Title V permits for GHG emissions would
be over $49 billion for affected sources and over $21 billion for
permitting authorities.47 Permitting authorities would have to
spend 200 times what they currently do.48 Most (96%) of these
sources would be commercial and residential buildings.49 The
required cost to regulate GHG emissions by the plain language of
the CAA would be astronomical and is therefore unrealistic.
The CAA requires that new major sources receive
individualized permit determinations of BACT as part of PSD.50
For existing facilities, the CAA requires Title V permits for any
source emitting more than 100 tpy of a regulated pollutant (now
including GHGs).51 Furthermore, the EPA cannot exempt major
sources from the requirements of Title V.52 Title V has stringent
requirements for permitting major sources that imply
individualized permit determinations. Title V permits for major
sources require enforceable emission limitations and standards, a
schedule of compliance, submission of required self-monitoring,
and an implementation plan.53 All Title V permits for major
45. See, e.g., Charles Ophardt, Combustion of Fossil Fuels, VIRTUAL
CHEMBOOK: ELMHURST COLLEGE (2003), available at http://www.elmhurst.edu/~
chm/vchembook/511natgascombust.html.
46. Id. (for example, natural gas is mostly methane, and the combustion of
methane combines a molecule of methane with two molecules of oxygen to create
a molecule of carbon dioxide, two molecules of water and lots of energy).
47. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL PREVENTION OF
SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND TITLE V GREENHOUSE GAS TAILORING RULE 36
(2010) [hereinafter REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS].
48. Operating Permits Burden, supra note 9.
49. REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 29.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7602 (2006).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a) (2006).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(c) (2006).
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sources have to be sent from the permitting authority to the EPA
for approval, as well as be available for public notice and
comment.54
III. THE TAILORING RULE IS LEGALLY SUSPECT
A. The Tailoring Rule
On May 13, 2010, the Obama Administration issued the
Tailoring Rule, which regulates GHG emissions from major
sources. It controls the regulatory burden of regulating GHG
emissions by sharply limiting the number of regulated sources.
The Tailoring Rule regulates emissions of six GHGs: carbon
dioxide,
methane,
nitrous
oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.55 Since each of these
GHGs has a different global warming potential (GWP) per ton of
emissions, the EPA uses standard international practice and
expresses GHGs in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e).56 The
Tailoring Rule details a three-step process for regulating GHG
emissions from stationary sources.57
During the first step of the Tailoring Rule, from January 2,
2011 to June 30, 2011, the EPA did not force any stationary
sources to get PSD or Title V permits solely for GHG emissions.58
Instead, only sources that would otherwise require PSD or Title V
permits for other air pollutants were subject to permitting for
GHG emissions.59 The only sources subject to PSD requirements
for Step 1 of the Tailoring Rule would be projects that increase

54. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(d) (2006) (EPA approval); 42 U.S.C. § 7661a (2012)
(public notice and comment).
55. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,518 (June 3, 2010).
56. For the purpose of calculating GHG emissions limits, the GWPs of the
different GHGs are: carbon dioxide (1), methane (21), nitrous oxide (310), HFC23 (11,700), HFC-134a (1,300), and sulfur hexafluoride (23,900). These GWPs
are calculated using a 100-year time horizon using the IPCC’s Second
Assessment Report (SAR) in order to be consistent with the international
standards under the United National Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) (IPCC, 1996).
57. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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net GHG emissions by 75,000 tpy CO2e and significantly
increased at least one non-GHG pollutant.60
The second step of the Tailoring Rule is from July 1, 2011 to
June 30, 2013.61
During this period, PSD permitting
requirements cover new construction projects that emit at least
100,000 tpy CO2e even if they do not exceed the permitting
thresholds for any other pollutant.62 Modifications at existing
facilities that increase GHG emissions by at least 75,000 tpy
CO2e are also subject to permitting requirements, even if they do
not significantly increase emissions of any other pollutant.63
Also, facilities that emit at least 100,000 tpy CO2e are subject to
Title V permitting requirements.64 EPA will need to issue about
1,100 new Title V permits (mostly solid waste landfills and
industrial manufacturers) and 900 additional PSD permits.65
In the third step of the Tailoring Rule, the EPA chose to
leave unchanged the GHG emission thresholds from Step 2.66
The EPA also made other technical changes to streamline
permitting for GHG emissions.67
Furthermore, by the end of April 2015, the EPA will complete
a study on remaining GHG permitting burdens that would exist if
the CAA were fully applied to smaller sources.68 The results of
this study will be used to complete a rule by April 30, 2016
further addressing CAA permitting for these facilities.69 At that
time, the EPA may decide that successful streamlining will allow
them to require that more sources obtain permits, but the EPA
also reserves the right to decide that certain smaller sources be
permanently excluded from permitting.70
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 31,568.
66. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule Step 3 and GHG Applicability Limits, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,051, 41,052
(July 12, 2012).
67. Id.
68. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010).
69. Id.
70. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/2

10

68

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

B. The EPA’s Arguments in Favor of the Legality of the
Tailoring Rule
As described above, the CAA requires that major sources get
permits, which are subject to strict requirements and approved by
permitting authorities on an individualized basis. However, the
Tailoring Rule states that most major sources of GHG emissions
do not have to get permits at all. The Tailoring Rule therefore
clashes with the plain language of the CAA.
The EPA gives three defenses for the Tailoring Rule and its
sharp departure from the plain language of the CAA:
(1) Congress did not intend for the EPA and other
permitting authorities to have to issue so many
permits for GHG emissions (absurd results);
(2) Permitting authorities cannot issue so many permits
(impossibility or administrative necessity);
(3) Permitting authorities cannot issue so many permits
now, and can postpone issuing so many permits until
the future when they can do so. (one-step-at-a-time).
Judicial review of regulations begins with Chevron, U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.71 In the two-part Chevron
test, a reviewing court determines:
(1) “First, always, is the question whether Congress has
spoken directly to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”
(2) “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”72
The Tailoring Rule appears to fall afoul of Chevron. The reasons
for this require a close look at case law on similar cases, which I
undertake below.

71. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
72. Id.
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a. Absurd Results
1. Definition and Expansion of the Absurd Results
Doctrine
In general, courts interpret statutes according to their plain
language, and the literal terms of a statute are to be overridden
only when the absurdity is so gross as to shock the general moral
or common sense.73 It is not enough that absurd consequences,
which were probably not within the contemplation of the
legislature, are produced.74
A classic example of the absurd results doctrine is United
States v. Kirby.75 In Kirby, a mail carrier was arrested for
murder while delivering the mail.76 The police officers who
arrested the mail carrier accused of murder were then indicted
for knowing and willfully obstructing the passage of the mail.77
The Supreme Court decided that the mail carrier’s arrest did not
violate the federal law against obstructing mail delivery, even
though the arrest while the mail carrier was delivering the mail
did knowingly obstruct mail delivery.78 The Supreme Court
allowed the police officers to violate the plain language of the
statute because:
All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always,
therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions
to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The
reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.79

In recent years, the absurd results doctrine has expanded to
include any case where a statute is interpreted contrary to its

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930).
Id.
74 U.S. 482 (1868).
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 486-87.
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plain meaning.80 In its brief to the D.C. Circuit defending the
Tailoring Rule, the EPA defines the absurd results doctrine (for
administrative agencies) as allowing an agency to divert from the
literal meaning of a statute where “acceptance of that meaning
would lead to absurd results . . . or would thwart the obvious
purpose of the statute.”81
The CAA requires major new and existing sources of GHG
emissions to get individualized permits. Major sources emit more
than 100 or 250 tons per year (100/250 tpy) of a regulated air
pollutant.82 For the Tailoring Rule to be legal by Chevron step 1,
the EPA has to argue that the CAA’s requirement to regulate
sources on an individualized basis emitting more than 100/250
tpy of a regulated pollutant (which GHGs now are) is not clear. If
the Tailoring Rule is legal by Chevron step 1, then in Chevron
step 2, EPA has to argue that the Tailoring Rule’s limitation of
GHG regulation to sources emitting more than 100,000 tpy CO2e
is a permissible construction of the CAA.
2. The EPA’s Arguments That the Tailoring Rule
Is Legal According to the Absurd Results
Doctrine
The EPA’s argument in its brief to the D.C. Circuit is based
on their definition of the absurd results doctrine, which is that
the plain language “would lead to absurd results . . . or would
thwart the obvious purpose of the statute.”83 However, regulating
more sources does not “thwart the obvious purpose of the

80. See Katherine Kirklin O’Brien, Comment, Beyond Absurdity: Climate
Regulation and the Case for Restricting the Absurd Results Doctrine, 86 WASH. L.
REV. 635, 638 (2011); NRDC v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating
that a state could express limits on phosphorus under the Clean Water Act in
terms of annual loads, even though the statute prescribes total maximum daily
loads) (emphasis added).
81. Brief of Respondent at 64, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA,
No. 10-1073 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases,
436 U.S. 631, 633 (1978) (quoting Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965)))
[hereinafter EPA Brief].
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(2) (2006).
83. EPA Brief, supra note 81, at 65 (quoting In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate
Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 633 (1978) (quoting Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571
(1965))).
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statute.” The purpose of the CAA is to “promote reasonable . . .
governmental actions . . . for pollution prevention.”84 As I show
later in this paper, there are reasonable ways to regulate more
sources. Furthermore, regulating more sources of GHG emissions
reduces GHG pollution and mitigates climate change.
The EPA justifies the Tailoring Rule by stating that “the
discretion accorded EPA to determine how to achieve Congress’s
intended objective is particularly acute when a situation arises
that may not have been contemplated by the specific terms of the
statute,”85 and as long as “the agency exercises its delegated
authority with common sense and fidelity to the intent of
Congress, its decision must be upheld.”86
In its defense of the Tailoring Rule, the EPA argues that it
can unilaterally exclude entities from regulation that Congress
has explicitly ordered it to regulate. The EPA, and not Congress,
would determine the scope of its own authority, and this violates
both Chevron and the separation of powers under the
Constitution.87
Furthermore, the EPA’s position that it can exclude entities
that Congress told it to regulate based on absurd results (or any
other doctrine) is contradicted by case law. In several cases,
agencies have attempted to avoid regulating entities because of
cost, stating that it would be absurd to spend large amounts of
money to fulfill statutory mandates. In these cases, courts force
agencies to regulate the entities that Congress has mandated
that they regulate.
In Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v. Hill, the Supreme
Court forced the TVA to follow the statutory mandates of the

84. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) (2006).
85. EPA Brief, supra note 81, at 69 (citing United States v. Haggar Apparel
Co., 526 U.S. 380, 393 (1999)). The EPA also cites Am. Trucking Ass’ns v.
United States, 344 U.S. 298, 309-10 (1953); Indep. Bankers Ass’n v. Marine
Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453, 461 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Fashioning policies in
response to events that were unforeseeable when the legislation was written is
one of the primary functions of executive agencies.”).
86. EPA Brief, supra note 81, at 69-70 (citing Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v.
Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 836 F.2d 599, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
87. See Nathan A. Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497
(2009).
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Endangered Species Act (ESA), even though the ESA’s mandates
would halt the nearly completed construction of the multi-million
dollar Tellico Dam.88 The ESA requires that federal agencies do
not take any action that is likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of endangered or threatened species or destroy or
adversely modify the habitat of such species.89 When the Tellico
Dam was almost complete, biologists discovered a previously
unknown species of perch, the snail darter.90 The area that
would be flooded by the Tellico Dam was the only known habitat
of the snail darter, and therefore there was legitimate fear that
the completion of the Tellico Dam would render the snail darter
This triggered District Court litigation for an
extinct.91
injunction against the completion of the Tellico Dam.92
The District Court ruled that it would be absurd to require “a
court to halt impoundment of water behind a fully completed dam
if an endangered species were discovered in the river on the day
before such impoundment was scheduled to take place. We
cannot conceive that Congress intended such a result.”93 The
Court of Appeals reversed and issued an injunction against the
completion of the Tellico Dam.94 The Supreme Court agreed,
maintaining the injunction and thereby rejecting TVA’s claim
that following the plain language of the ESA and prohibiting the
completion of a near complete multimillion dollar dam would be
absurd.95 TVA v. Hill stands for the idea that the absurd results
doctrine cannot be used to overturn the plain language of
Congressional statutes just because following those dictates
would be expensive. Similarly, the EPA is at risk of having a
court vacate the Tailoring Rule on the merits because it does not
regulate most major sources of GHG emissions that Congress
demands the EPA regulate.
88. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). This part of the ESA is unchanged since its
original passage. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 160.
90. TVA, 437 U.S. at 158.
91. Id. at 162-63.
92. Id. at 165-66.
93. Id. at 166-67 (citing Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753, 763 (E.D. Tenn.
(1976)).
94. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1069 (6th Cir. 1977).
95. TVA, 437 U.S. at 195.

15

2012]

USING BUILDING CODES

73

The most damning indictment of the Tailoring Rule comes
from current interpretations of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The
CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the
United States without a permit.96 A permit can be granted
pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES).97
In two cases, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v.
Costle,98 and Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA,99 the
EPA attempted to exclude categories of pollution sources from
permit requirements of the NPDES and was rebuked by federal
appeals courts. In both cases, the EPA lost and was forced to
regulate the sources of pollution that it tried to exclude. These
decisions suggest that the Tailoring Rule is legally suspect
because it excludes from regulation sources of pollution that
Congress requires the EPA to regulate.
In NRDC v. Costle, the EPA excluded several classes of
pollution sources from NPDES permit requirements that
otherwise would have required permits by the plain language of
the CWA.100
For example, concentrated animal feeding
operations (CAFOs) are defined as point sources in the CWA and
require permits, but EPA’s 1973 regulations stated that CAFOs
below a certain size did not require permits.101 The EPA justified
the exclusion of small CAFOs and other pollution sources by
stating that it wanted to conserve its enforcement resources for
more significant sources of water pollution.102
Furthermore, the justifications for the EPA’s unlawful
exclusion of sources from regulation in NRDC v. Costle sound
similar to EPA’s justifications for the Tailoring Rule. The D.C.
Circuit stated:
The appellants have stressed . . . the extraordinary burden on the
EPA that will be imposed by [forcing EPA to require permits of
96. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).
98. 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
99. 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008).
100. 568 F.2d at 1377.
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006) (defining point sources); 40 C.F.R. § 125.4
(1975), vacated by NRDC, 568 F.2d 1369.
102. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1372-73.
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sources now excluded]. The spectre of millions of applications for
permits is evoked both as part of appellants’ legislative history
[absurd results] argument that Congress could not have intended
to impose such burdens on the EPA . . . .103

The D.C. Circuit went on to reject the EPA’s concerns, stating,
“[t]he technological or administrative infeasibility of such
limitations may result in adjustments in the permit programs . . .
but it does not authorize the Administrator to exclude the
relevant point source from the NPDES program.”104 The D.C.
Circuit made this decision even though it acknowledged that over
400,000 additional sources might require permits.105
Similarly, the EPA promulgated a regulation that excluded
several types of discharges from ships (vessels) from permitting
requirements, and in Northwest Environmental Advocates v.
EPA, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the vacating of the EPA’s
regulation.106 In this case, the EPA had excluded vessel wastes
from NPDES permitting requirements in order to “reduce
administrative costs drastically.”107 This is similar to the goals of
the Tailoring Rule. However, the text of the CWA does not
exempt vessel discharges from NPDES requirements.108 EPA’s
defense of its regulation did not explicitly use the absurd results
doctrine, but did state that the CWA could be interpreted to
exclude vessel discharges from CWA permit requirements. But
the Ninth Circuit followed NRDC v. Costle and forced the EPA to
regulate the vessel discharges in question.109
To summarize, the precedents of TVA v. Hill, NRDC v.
Costle, and Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA strongly
suggest that an agency cannot use the large number of permits or
cost of providing those permits required under law as a
justification for promulgating a regulation that waives permitting
103. Id. at 1377.
104. Id. at 1379.
105. Id. at 1380.
106. 537 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court decision
to vacate 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) (2006)).
107. National Pollution Discharge System, 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528, 13,528 (May
22, 1973).
108. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).
109. Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1021.
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for most of those sources of pollution. This suggests that the
EPA’s “absurd results” justification for the Tailoring Rule would
likely be rejected by a court reaching a decision on the merits of
the rule.
b. Administrative Necessity
The CAA provides the EPA with a very difficult problem
because it was not designed to mitigate climate change.110 The
last major amendments to the CAA were made in 1990, when
climate change was not broadly debated in Congress.111 At the
same time, the CAA is a blanket statute meant to deal with all
air pollutants, and carbon dioxide is an air pollutant by the letter
of the CAA. Attempts to update or supersede the CAA to mitigate
climate change have died in Congress.
Without the Tailoring Rule, millions of smaller sources would
require permits under the CAA, compared to about 15,000
stationary sources today.112 The EPA’s position is that the
administrative burdens of permitting large numbers of newlysubject sources would “greatly increas[e] the number of required
permits, impos[e] undue costs on small sources, overwhelm[] the
resources of permitting authorities, and severely impair[] the
functioning of the programs.”113 The Tailoring Rule is designed
to avoid overburdening the EPA and state and local permitting
agencies.114
The D.C. Circuit gave its standard for administrative
necessity in Alabama Power v. Costle.115 Alabama Power is a
very complicated case, dealing with regulations under the CAA as
110. See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 40 ENV. L. 1261, 1323 (2010) (“The CAA is not a tool designed to deal
with GHG emissions, or more specifically CO2.”); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal
Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options?, 36 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1 (2009).
111. But see generally AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE (1992) (detailing Gore’s
vision for solving the world’s environmental crises, including climate change).
112. EPA, Final Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule: Fact Sheet (May 13, 2010), http://www.epa.gov
/nsr/documents/20100413fs.pdf.
113. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,514 (June 3, 2010).
114. Id.
115. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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they existed after the 1977 Amendments (but before the 1990
amendments which created the current CAA).116 One major issue
was the promulgation of an EPA regulation that excluded sources
that actually emitted less than 50 tpy (but had the potential to
emit more than the PSD program’s 100/250 tpy threshold) from
the CAA’s statutory requirement to regulate sources with the
potential to emit more than 100/250 tpy.117 The D.C. Circuit
overturned this regulation as beyond agency discretion.118
The D.C. Circuit justified the overturning of the regulation
above by developing a test for agency claims of administrative
necessity. For cases in which an agency seeks approval of a
prospective exemption of certain categories from a statutory
demand (like the Tailoring Rule and Alabama Power), the test is
as follows:
● “[c]ategorical exemptions from the clear commands of a
regulatory statute, though sometimes permitted, are not
favored.”119 The court uses NRDC v. Costle (where the EPA
tried to exempt categories of pollution sources from permit
requirements of the CWA) as precedent to deny categorical
exemptions from statutory mandates.120
● “Categorical exemptions may also be permissible as an
exercise of agency power . . . to overlook circumstances that
in context may fairly be considered de minimis.”121
● But, “[t]hat implied authority [of categorical exemptions
for de minimis] is not available for a situation where the
regulatory function does provide benefits, in the sense of
furthering the regulatory objectives, but the agency
concludes that the acknowledged benefits are exceeded by
the costs.”122
The Tailoring Rule is legally suspect according to the precedent of
Alabama Power because it exempts categories of emitters from
regulation (those between 100/250 and 75,000/100,000 tpy CO2e)
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id. at 349.
Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 361.
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instead of using streamlined methods of administering an
expanded regulatory program. Furthermore, the Tailoring Rule
is legally suspect because it is a categorical exemption by rule
that cannot be fairly called de minimis. By the EPA’s own
admission, without the Tailoring Rule, 78% of total national
stationary source GHG emissions would be regulated, compared
with 67% of such emissions with the Tailoring Rule.123
c. One-Step-at-a-Time
The one-step-at-a-time doctrine comes from case law, and
recognizes that agencies may implement statutory mandates
incrementally when the agency remains on track to implement
the statutory mandate as a whole.124 In promulgating the
Tailoring Rule, the EPA argues that more time to implement
regulation of GHG emissions will allow time to “develop
streamlining measures, acquire expertise, and increase
resources.”125
The test for one-step-at-a-time agency implementation of
statutory mandates was developed by the D.C. Circuit in
National Ass’n of Broadcasters v. Federal Communications
Commission.126 In Broadcasters, the court examined the FCC’s
interim regulations of new satellite broadcasting technology
called “direct broadcast satellite service” (DBS).127 The interim
regulations left crucial details about how to allocate spectrum
until a future rulemaking.128
Several intervenors sued to
overturn this part of the regulation, calling it arbitrary and
capricious.129
The D.C. Circuit developed a two-part test for one-step-at-atime rulemaking:
(1) “As long as the agency’s predictions [of the nature and
magnitude of the problem it will have to confront when
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Operating Permits Burden, supra note 9.
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed Reg. 31,514, 31,544 (June 3, 2010).
Id. at 31,533.
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1209.
Id.
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it comes to resolve the postponed issue] of future events
are plausible and flow from the factual record compiled,
a reviewing court should accept the agency’s
estimation.”130
(2) “Postponement will be most easily justified when an
agency acts against a background of rapid technical and
social change and when the agency’s initial decision as
a practical matter is reversible should the future
proceedings yield drastically unexpected results.”131 In
contrast, an incremental approach to agency decision
making is least justified when small errors in predictive
judgment can have catastrophic effects on the public
welfare, or when future proceedings are likely to be
systematically defective in taking into account certain
relevant interests.132
The FCC passed that test in Broadcasters.133 First, the FCC had
reasonable estimates of the nature and magnitude of the problem
it had to confront.134 Second, DBS technology was so new that
the FCC could not predict the demand for spectrum.135 So the
FCC waited a short period of time and then promulgated a
regulation to answer the spectrum allocation questions left
unanswered in the interim regulation.136
The FCC’s two-part test needs to be evaluated in context
with the rest of the case. The D.C. Circuit in Broadcasters states
that agencies have “no authority to experiment with its statutory
obligations.”137 This statement is made concerning part of the
DBS regulation that exempted some DBS systems from the
broadcast restrictions of Title III of the Communications Act of
1934.138 These include, but are not limited to, requirements that

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1211.
Id.
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1211.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1201.
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1199.
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qualified candidates for office be provided reasonable access to
broadcast facilities.139
However, section 3(o) of the Communications Act defined
“broadcasting” as “the dissemination of radio communications
intended to be received by the public, directly or by the
intermediary of relay stations.”140 This meant that exempting
DBS systems that transmitted signals directly to homes was
unlawful, and that part of the FCC’s DBS regulations was
overturned.141
In this respect, the Tailoring Rule is very similar to the part
of the DBS regulation in Broadcasters; both attempt to exempt
categories of entities explicitly regulated by statute from
regulation.
The D.C. Circuit would not allow this in
Broadcasters, and is unlikely to allow the EPA to exempt major
sources of GHG emissions from CAA regulation. The Tailoring
Rule does not promise to regulate all major sources of GHG
emissions under the CAA; instead the EPA only promises a study
and further rulemaking in 2016.142 The EPA justifies this by
noting that it can exclude some major sources from regulation
through the absurd results doctrine.143 So if the use of the
absurd results doctrine in the Tailoring Rule is unlawful, so is the
use of the one-step-at-a-time doctrine.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the EPA could pass
the second prong of Broadcasters two-part test for use of the onestep-at-a-time doctrine. The second prong requires a background
of “rapid technical and social change.”144 In Broadcasters, there
was serious uncertainty about the use of spectrum associated
with new technology, which was crucial information to the
regulation.145
The EPA asserts that it is working within
uncertain factual circumstances and future events because the
ability of the EPA to follow the statutory directive depends not

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1203.
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010).
Id.
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1211.
Id. at 1209.
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only on the development of streamlining measures, but also on
enhancing the resources of permitting agencies.146
There is always uncertainty, so the type of uncertainty
relevant to whether or not the EPA can comply with the letter of
the law is whether the factual landscape is so uncertain that they
cannot adequately regulate. In Broadcasters, the FCC was
hesitant to regulate a very new technology where no one knew
how the technology would develop.147 With the Tailoring Rule,
patterns of carbon emissions do not change quickly and can be
determined.
The federal government might not have this
information right now, but they can and should have this
information well before 2016, the date at which the EPA plans to
possibly comply with the plain language of the CAA.
The EPA is correct when they state that there is uncertainty
about future budgets of both the EPA and permitting authorities.
Mass. v. EPA did greatly change enforcement of the CAA, as it
potentially added millions of sources, mostly buildings, to the
CAA regulatory program. However, this could be said about all
agencies and all regulations. Furthermore, enforcement of the
CWA has had similar issues of large-scale expansion of the
number of permits required.
The vacating of the EPA’s
regulation excluding many vessels caused between 115,000 and
138,000 smaller vessels and about 71,000 larger vessels to require
permits.148
To conclude, the EPA likely cannot defend the Tailoring Rule
using the one-step-at-a-time doctrine. The Tailoring Rule likely
fails the second prong of the test in Broadcasters (“rapid technical
and social change”), and Broadcasters probably cannot be
interpreted to allow agencies to preemptively exempt a category
of sources from anti-pollution regulations.
146. See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,547.
147. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1211.
148. See EPA, ECONOMIC AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SMALL
VESSEL
GENERAL
PERMIT
ix
(Nov.
30,
2011),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/vgp_economic_analysis_svgp2011.pdf (number of
smaller vessels requiring permits) [hereinafter SMALL VESSEL GENERAL PERMIT];
EPA, ECONOMIC AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED 2013 VESSEL GENERAL
PERMIT 1 (2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/vgp_
economic_analysis_draftpermit2011.pdf (number of larger vessels, including
domestic flag and foreign flag vessels, requiring permits).
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IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF USING BUILDING
CODES TO REGULATE GHG EMISSIONS UNDER
THE CAA
Earlier in this paper, I stated the three possible approaches
the EPA could use to regulate GHG emissions from buildings:
(1) follow the plain language of the CAA and require
millions of buildings (and other sources of GHG
emissions) to get individualized permits–costing
permitting agencies $22.5 billion;149
(2) regulate fewer buildings on an individualized basis.
The EPA chose to do this with the Tailoring Rule, and
the Tailoring Rule costs permitting agencies only $105
million, instead of $22.5 billion.150
However, the
Tailoring Rule leaves millions of buildings unregulated
that the CAA and Mass. v. EPA imply should be
regulated; or
(3) regulate millions of buildings on a general (not
individualized) basis, issuing regulations for certain
types of buildings, rather than for each individual
building. In this paper, I propose that the EPA regulate
buildings emitting more than 100 or 250 tpy CO2e by
forcing states to enact more energy-efficient building
codes for those buildings.
Option 2, embodied in the Tailoring Rule, is legally suspect. In
the rest of this paper, I demonstrate that Option 3, forcing states
to adopt more energy efficient building codes, is both legally
sound and good policy.
A. The EPA’s Description of Its Options
On July 12, 2012, the EPA released its final rule for Step 3 of
the Tailoring Rule.151
Its proposed rule maintains the
applicability thresholds (75,000/100,000 tpy CO2e) and proposed
streamlining approaches to improve the administration of GHG
149. Operating Permits Burden, supra note 9.
150. Id.
151. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule Step 3 and GHG Applicability Limitations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,051,
41,055 (July 12, 2012).
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PSD and Title V permitting programs.152 The proposed rule also
solicits comments on these streamlining approaches, including
general permits and presumptive BACT (pBACT) in case EPA is
forced to regulate all sources above the statutory threshold.153
The EPA concluded that these options were promising, but would
take more than two years to develop, propose, and finalize and
therefore would not be available by January 2, 2011, the date
PSD and Title V permitting requirements would be triggered.
The proposed rule shows that the EPA is struggling with the
idea of how to regulate smaller major sources. In 2010, EPA
estimated that PSD and Title V requirements would require
regulation of over six million sources.154 Almost 1.4 million of
those sources are commercial, while another 4.5 million of those
sources are residential.155 Almost 179,000 of those sources are
industrial.156
B. General Permits
The CAA authorizes general permits for existing major
sources (Title V), but not for new major sources (PSD). A general
permit covers numerous single sources and is completed after
notice and opportunity for a public hearing.157 Sources subject to
a general permit must still apply for that permit and fulfill all of
the requirements of that permit.158
Permit applications have to have (a) a date the permit is
active, and (b) a compliance plan for how the source will comply
with all applicable requirements, including a schedule of
compliance and a schedule by which a permittee will submit
progress reports at least every six months.159 The permitting
official shall certify the accuracy of the information submitted,
and a copy of each permit application, compliance plan (including
schedule of compliance), emissions or compliance monitoring
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 41,052.
Id. at 41,055.
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 29.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 7661c(d) (2006).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 7661b (2006).

25

2012]

USING BUILDING CODES

83

report, certification, and issued permit shall be available to the
public.160 The conditions attached to general permits come from
the rest of the CAA.
Under the CAA, the EPA lists categories of stationary
sources that can “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.”161 There are separate standards for new and
existing sources, and the standards for existing sources take into
account the remaining useful life of the source and other
factors.162
The EPA may find it very difficult, if not impossible, to
enforce all of the requirements of general permits for GHG
emissions from buildings. The permitting official may not even
be able to certify the accuracy of the information submitted.
However, a copy of each permit application and each issued
permit can be made available to the public electronically,
fulfilling the language of the CAA.
General permits exist under the CAA and other
environmental laws. The exact nature of general permits varies
from state to state, but the number of general permits is
extensive. To take Pennsylvania as an example, Pennsylvania
has a very long list of general permits.163 Many of these general
permits are CAA permits. They include (but are not limited to):
storage tanks for volatile organic liquids, burn-off ovens,
petroleum dry cleaning, nonroad engines, crematories, dry
abrasive blasting operations, and others.
Most general permits are under the Clean Water Act (CWA).
Examples of these permits include Construction General Permits,
Nationwide Permits, and Vessel General Permits.

160. Id.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
162. Id.
163. See Licensing, Permits and Certification, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT.,
http://www.depweb.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/licensing%2C_permit
s___certification/6009 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
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a. Construction General Permits
Construction General Permits (CGPs) under § 402 of the
Clean Water Act (CWA)164 regulate stormwater discharges
associated with construction activity (such as cleaning, grading,
excavating, and stockpiling) that disturb one or more acres, or
smaller sites that are part of a larger common plan of
development or sale. This is part of the CWA’s National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) stormwater program.165
Prior to discharging stormwater, construction operators must
obtain coverage under an NPDES permit, which is administered
by the state (if it has been authorized to operate the NPDES
stormwater program) or EPA, depending on where the
construction site is located. The CGP requires compliance with
effluent limits and other permit requirements, such as the
development of a Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan
(SWPPP). Construction operators intending to seek coverage
under EPA’s CGP must submit a Notice of Intent (NOI) certifying
that they have met the permit’s eligibility conditions and that
they will comply with the permit’s requirements (install and
maintain Best Management Practices, conduct biweekly
inspections, record any plan changes, etc.). The operator submits
the NOI online.
b. Nationwide Permits
The Nationwide Permit Program (NWP) under § 404(e) of the
CWA,166 which authorizes the discharge of dredged or fill
materials into waters of the U.S., was specifically designed to
provide a relatively streamlined mechanism for the Corps to
approve projects with relatively minor environmental impacts,
freeing the Corps to use administrative resources for more
environmentally significant requests for individual permits.167 In

164. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006); see also EPA Construction General Permit, EPA,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/cgp.cfm#final2008cgp (last visited Oct.
30, 2012).
165. Id.
166. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2006).
167. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders to Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, EPA
(April 20, 2012) (on file with author) (comments on Prevention of Significant
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its comments to the EPA, the National Association of Home
Builders (NAHB) states that over time the Corps has made the
NWP requirements more stringent to limit their availability and
make them more cumbersome and difficult to obtain.168 NAHB
notes that when first adopted, a project proponent who believed
his or her project met an NWP’s requirements could proceed
immediately, operating under the auspices and protection of the
NWP without further notice to the Corps. Now, the Corps
requires most applicants to comply with extensive preconstruction notification requirements. Likewise, current NWPs
impose significant paperwork burdens both on those who use the
NWPs and the Corps staff who have to implement the
requirements,
creating
delays
and
undermining
the
administrative efficiency the NWPs were originally designed to
achieve.169 The average applicant for a nationwide permit spends
313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design
changes.170
The experience with the NWP permit suggests that general
permits for GHG emissions would have to be extremely
streamlined to be at all practical.
c. Vessel General Permits (including Small Vessel
General Permits)
The EPA regulates vessel (ship) discharges with the Vessel
General Permit (VGP). The VGP regulates discharges incidental
to the normal operation of vessels operating in a capacity as a
means of transportation. The VGP includes general effluent
limits applicable to all discharges; general effluent limits
applicable to 26 specific discharge streams; narrative water-based
effluent limits; inspection, monitoring, recordkeeping, and
reporting requirements; and additional requirements applicable
to certain vessel types. Submission is generally through the
Vessels eNOI system.

Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule Step 3, Docket
Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0517, at 5-6).
168. Id. at 6.
169. Id.
170. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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The EPA has proposed a Small Vessel General Permit
(sVGP) for non-recreational, non-military vessels less than 79
feet, starting in 2013.171 To get a sVGP, a vessel operator must:
● Meet the sVGP eligibility requirements;
● Obtain a Permit Authorization and Record of Inspection
(PARI) form onboard their vessel to certify that they have read
and understood the terms of the permit and to document
performance of the required annual inspection (there is no
requirement to submit a Notice of Intent);
● Implement the effluent limits according to the requirements
in Part 2 of the sVGP, including by conducting routine
inspections that may be needed to verify compliance with the
discharge limits; and
● Conduct the required annual self-inspection.172
Between 115,000 and 138,000 vessels will be potentially subject
to the sVGP.173
EPA finds that per vessel incremental
compliance costs average between $17 and $98 per year,
depending on the number of applicable discharge categories and
baseline practices.174 A majority of vessels subject to the sVGP
are commercial fishing vessels.175
d. Problems with the Use of General Permits under
the CWA and CAA
The EPA has accepted the problems associated with the use
of general permits to fulfill permitting requirements under the
CWA. It has not had much choice; several parts of the CWA
would be unworkable without general permits because of the
large number of entities that require permits. Many pollution
plans are neither reviewed nor approved by the government, and
there is limited public participation in permit issuance and
enforcement.176
171. SMALL VESSEL GENERAL PERMIT, supra note 148, at ix.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at x.
175. Id. at 4.
176. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under
the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 410, 412 (2007).
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Similarly, the EPA would have to accept problems with a
general permit regime under the CAA to regulate GHGs. The
huge numbers of permits required means that the EPA cannot
allow comment on individual permits if it hopes to administer the
program.
Furthermore, EPA’s ability to regulate existing
buildings may be severely limited, even with the use of general
permits, because millions of buildings need to be regulated. This
is especially true because the CAA allows for citizen suits to
enforce permit requirements or dereliction of nondiscretionary
duties by the EPA Administrator.177
Furthermore, EPA’s ability to enforce general permits may
be very limited. In some cases, the general permit process may
be simply a notification of requirements under the law, and
violations of those requirements will tend to go unnoticed and
unpunished. This is mostly unavoidable with a very large
number of permits, and the notification of requirements coming
from the general permit may be enough to induce at least limited
compliance, which is probably an improvement over no regulation
at all for relatively small emitters.
C. Presumptive BACT (pBACT)
PSD requires that new sources of regulated pollutants (now
including GHGs) be subject to best available control technology
(BACT). BACT is defined in the CAA as:
[A]n emission limitation based on the maximum degree of
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act
emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility,
which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and
other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through
application of production processes and available methods,
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or
treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of
each such pollutant.178

177. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006).
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To determine BACT, EPA usually uses a five-step “top-down”
analysis.
The steps are: (1) “[i]dentify all available control
technologies;” (2) “[e]liminate technically infeasible options;” (3)
evaluate and rank the remaining technologies based on
environmental effectiveness; (4) evaluate the cost-effectiveness of
controls after considering energy and other environmental
impacts; and (5) “[s]elect BACT.”179 The primary guidance is
EPA’s 1990 New Source Review Workshop Manual.180
Determining the appropriate technology requires consideration of
process changes, fuel substitution, add-on controls, and any other
available methods to obtain the maximum degree of emission
reduction.181 The process begins by requiring a permit applicant
seeking a permit to meet new source performance standards
(NSPS) for its industrial category (promulgated by EPA pursuant
to section 111 of the CAA).182 States may impose additional
standards, and EPA may delegate authority to run the PSD
program to states.183 Many states administer all or part of the
PSD program. However, there is no technology to control CO 2
emissions that appears to fit the BACT definition in the CAA.184
Since BACT must now be done on a case-by-case basis for
each permit applicant, EPA is evaluating the use of pBACT,
under which it would develop a “standardized BACT for certain
emissions units [sources of GHG emissions].”185 Similar to
general permits, the agency would determine pBACT for certain
sources and expect industry to comply with its determination.186
179. GHG Plantwide Applicability Limitations and GHG Synthetic Minor
Limitations, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,226, 14,252 (Mar. 8, 2012).
180. EPA, DRAFT NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL: PREVENTION OF
SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND NONATTAINMENT AREA PERMITTING (1990),
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/gen/wkshpman.pdf [hereinafter NEW SOURCE REVIEW
WORKSHOP MANUAL].
181. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006).
184. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Clean Air Symposium: The Intersection of Climate
Change and Clean Air Act Stationary Source Programs, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901,
916 (2011); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).
185. GHG Plantwide Applicability Limitations and GHG Synthetic Minor
Limitations, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,226, 14,252 (Mar. 8, 2012).
186. Id. at 14,251.
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EPA suggests that pBACT could be implemented through the
general permit process.187 EPA uses natural gas-fired boilers as
an example application of pBACT and expressly suggests tying
pBACT to the Department of Energy’s (DOE) statutory obligation
to set energy efficiency standards or to the ENERGY STAR
program.188
EPA has considered several approaches to implement
pBACT. The first approach would develop, through notice-andcomment rulemaking or permitting guidance, a pBACT level for
sources in a particular source category that subsequently could be
applied and assessed in individual permitting actions.189 In that
approach, the top-down analysis for an individual permit would
be fulfilled by a request to include the pBACT limit; there would
still be an opportunity for permitting authorities and the public to
examine individual permits to assess whether there are
significant case-specific energy, economic, and/or environmental
impacts that would require adjustment of the presumed limit for
that particular source.190
This shifts the burden to the
permitting authority or other interested parties to produce
credible evidence that the application of pBACT to a particular
source would not comply with BACT requirements.191
This approach might be suitable and appropriate for some
relatively large sources. However, for smaller sources, this could
be problematic because it would give extra opportunities for antidevelopment forces to stop development by challenging the
energy efficiency of a development. This could even be a problem
for larger sources; some large apartment buildings emit tens of
thousands of GHGs per year, and anti-development activists
could challenge these permits in order to stop development.
The EPA has also discussed an approach where pBACT
levels for a specific category of emissions would be developed
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and public comment
would not be allowed for an individual source. This would not
187. Id.
188. Id. at 14,251 (natural gas boilers as example for general permits and
pBACT); Id. at 14,254 (tying pBACT to ENERGY STAR program).
189. Id. at 14,252-53.
190. Id. at 14,253.
191. Id.
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follow the individual case-by-case BACT determinations
envisioned in the CAA, but would be much more practical for
regulating large numbers of small sources.192
Using pBACT would streamline PSD permitting and promote
consistency in BACT determinations as various permitting
authorities gain experience with GHG permitting.193 The EPA is
especially interested in combining general permits and pBACT,
but worries that it might lose the technology forcing aspect of
case-by-case BACT determinations.194 Controls identified in
prior
permits
are
considered
in
subsequent
BACT
determinations, so an approach using pBACT could lose that.195
Periodic revisions of pBACT could avoid this. Combining these
approaches could provide an economical means of issuing very
large numbers of permits and achieving reductions in GHG
emissions from buildings and other stationary sources from
smaller major emitters not currently covered by the Tailoring
Rule.
D. Building Codes
EPA attempts to justify the Tailoring Rule by noting that
millions of buildings would be subject to regulation for GHG
emissions without the Tailoring Rule. However, the EPA’s
justification does not acknowledge that all buildings are already
subject to government regulation–building codes. These codes are
generally state and local codes, but they cover every local home
and business.
a. The Legality of Using Building Codes to Regulate
GHG Emissions
Under PSD, new major sources are regulated using BACT.
BACT is defined in the CAA as:
[A]n emission limitation based on the maximum degree of
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act
192.
193.
194.
195.

See discussion infra Part IV.d.
See 77 Fed. Reg. at 14,253.
Id.
Id.
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emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility,
which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and
other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through
application of production processes and available methods,
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or
treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of
each such pollutant.196

As stated above, this provides a problem in that many new major
sources would have to apply for permits, which would have to be
approved on a case-by-case basis. This would be very expensive,
both for permittees and permitting agencies.
The EPA’s idea for combining general permits and pBACT is
a good idea, but in order to use it for PSD, the EPA has to be able
to interpret BACT as allowing the use of categorical (and not
case-by-case) determinations for smaller major sources of GHG
emissions. In fact, case law suggests that the EPA can (and
should) interpret the CAA in this fashion.
In Alabama Power, the D.C. Circuit states that “[c]ourts
frequently uphold streamlined agency approaches or procedures
where the conventional course, typically case-by-case
determinations, would, as a practical matter, prevent the agency
from carrying out the mission assigned to it by Congress.”197 It is
clear that the EPA cannot do case-by-case determination for tens
of thousands of new buildings and millions of existing buildings.
Even though it may depart from the statutory requirements of
BACT, using pBACT and general permits for smaller major
sources of GHG emissions may be closer to the congressional
intent for the PSD program.198
Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala,199 also supports this
interpretation.
Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. concerned the
question of whether the FDA could approve a drug that was being
attacked under a patent infringement action.200 The D.C. Circuit

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006).
Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
See 77 Fed. Reg. at 14,253.
140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1062.
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disagreed with the FDA’s interpretation of the underlying
statute, writing “[w]hen the agency concludes that a literal
reading of a statute would thwart the purposes of Congress, it
may deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect
congressional intent.”201 A rule that avoids using case-by-case
determination of BACT and regulates all of the sources that
Congress says to regulate does less violence to the statute than
the Tailoring Rule, which does not regulate all of the sources that
Congress says to regulate. Alabama Power also states, “[b]efore a
court sanctions such actions, it will carefully study the governing
statute . . . to ascertain whether the statute authorizes
approaches that deviate from the legislative mandate in response
to concerns about feasibility.”202 The use of general permits and
pBACT to regulate smaller major GHG emitters likely passes
these tests.
Furthermore, the EPA has some flexibility when determining
BACT. When the EPA determines BACT, it generates a list of
categories of stationary sources that “cause, or contribute
significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”203 The EPA
then establishes federal “standards of performance” for new
sources within each category, and can distinguish between
different “classes, types, and sizes” within each category in
establishing such standards.204 A “standard of performance” is
defined as
a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the
degree of emission limitation achievable through the application
of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair
quality health and environmental impact and energy
requirements) the [EPA] determines has been adequately
demonstrated.205

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 1068.
Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 360.
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B).
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
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The EPA can issue a design, equipment, work practice, or
operation standard if “it is not feasible to prescribe or enforce a
standard of performance.”206 This covers any situation where:
(A) a pollutant or pollutants cannot be emitted through a
conveyance designed and constructed to emit or capture such
pollutant, or that any requirement for, or use of, such a
conveyance would be inconsistent with any Federal, State, or
local law, or (B) the application of measurement methodology to a
particular class of sources is not practicable due to technological
or economic limitations.207

The definition of BACT, especially the phrase “emitted from
or results from any major emitting facility,” is probably capacious
enough to include building codes. 208 This strongly suggests that
even if a building was all-electric and the power plant, not the
building, emitted GHGs, the GHGs emissions could be seen as
resulting from the building.
Furthermore, not allowing the use of building codes to
regulate GHG emissions from buildings would be an absurd
result. Not allowing the use of building codes could, and probably
would, lead to absurdities like regulation of natural gas boilers
but no similar regulation of electric heaters because electric
heaters themselves do not emit GHGs and natural gas heaters
do. This could encourage builders to build using electric heat,
even when natural gas would be most appropriate on air pollution
and energy efficiency grounds.
The use of building codes to regulate GHG emissions is in
some ways analogous to regulating lead in public drinking water
systems in American Water Works Ass’n.209 In American Water
Works Ass’n, the D.C. Circuit stated that “where a literal reading
of a statutory term would lead to absurd results, the term simply
‘has no meaning . . . and is the proper subject of construction by
the EPA and the courts.’”210 In American Water Works Ass’n, the
EPA regulated lead by corrosion controls and not by an MCL set
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)(1).
42 U.S.C. 7411(h)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006).
Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1271.
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at the tap because lead contamination of drinking water comes
from old pipes (usually in private homes beyond the jurisdiction
of the EPA) carrying the water, not from the water source.211
Therefore, it is almost impossible to determine the level of lead in
a public water system; it varies depending on where the water is
drawn and the temperature of the water.212 Building codes would
be a way to regulate GHG emissions from buildings that would
both regulate actual emissions, as well as reduce energy needed
inside of buildings.
b. Outline of a Building Code Approach to Regulating
GHG Emissions from Buildings
A building code approach to regulating GHG emissions from
buildings would have to cover both new and existing buildings.
The approach is clearer for new (or extensively rebuilt) buildings,
but the EPA has options for regulating existing buildings as well.
The CAA gives the EPA and permitting authorities the
authority to write general permits for existing sources. These
general permits would be difficult to enforce due to how many
would need to be issued, but the EPA would likely be within the
letter of the law. These general permits would enforce more
energy efficient building codes for existing buildings and be
enforced by each state as part of a document like a State
Implementation Plan (SIP).213 If a state refused to enact and
enforce more energy efficient building codes for existing
buildings, the federal government could enforce something like a
Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).

211. Drinking Water Regulations; Maximum Contaminant Level Goals and
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for Lead and Copper, 53 Fed.
Reg. 31,516, 31,526-27 (proposed Aug. 18, 1988) (noting that lead contamination
of drinking water is rarely from the source of the water); Maximum
Contaminant Level Goals and National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for
Lead and Copper, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,460, 26,473-76 (final June 7, 1991) (noting
that lead contamination of drinking water comes from pipes, often in people’s
homes).
212. See Am. Water Works Ass’n, 40 F.3d at 1269.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2006).
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Unfortunately, most U.S. building codes for existing
buildings do not have provisions for energy efficiency.214
Therefore, there is not a clear U.S.-based model for such building
codes.
However, the European Union (EU) has issued a directive to
In the EU,
improve energy efficiency of all buildings.215
directives are issues by the European Union, and each member
state (country) of the EU has to pass legislation or regulations to
enforce EU directives.216 The EU’s Directive on the Energy
Performance of Buildings requires member states to write and
enforce energy efficiency building codes for both new and existing
buildings.217
New buildings, rented buildings, and public
buildings will need to have an “energy performance certificate”
which details the relative energy efficiency of every building.218
There is no single approach to regulating energy efficiency in
existing buildings. The current approach in Europe mandates
high-energy efficiency standards for renovations and energy
performance certificates for rented buildings. Some states in the
United States have programs where extra taxes on energy bills
are used to retrofit existing buildings.219 Some combination of
these methods of increasing energy efficiency could be mandated
in the equivalent of SIPs.220
Building codes cover all new buildings, not just buildings
whose GHG emissions would be covered by the CAA.221 To
convert these codes into regulation of new buildings, the EPA
would likely use general permits and pBACT to regulate smaller
major sources of GHGs. BACT is set in a five step process: (1)
identify all available control technologies; (2) eliminate
214. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BUILDING ENERGY CODES 101: AN
INTRODUCTION 5 (2010) [hereinafter BUILDING ENERGY CODES].
215. Council Directive 2010/31, 2010 O.J. (L 153) 13 (EU).
216. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union art. 194(2), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 135 [hereinafter
TFEU].
217. Council Directive 2010/31, art. 4, 2010 O.J. (L 153) 13, 19 (EU).
218. Id. art. 12.
219. See Energy Programs, CONN. ENERGY EFFICIENCY FUND, http://ctsaves
energy.org/programs/index.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
221. BUILDING ENERGY CODES, supra note 214, at 5.
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technically infeasible options; (3) evaluate and rank the
remaining technologies based on environmental effectiveness; (4)
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of controls after considering
energy and other environmental impacts; and (5) select BACT. 222
Presumptive BACT would be set the same way, but not case-bycase as is prescribed by the CAA.223 Instead, the EPA would have
to issue general permits because of the very large number of
permits required. The EPA issues many general permits under
the CWA, it stands to reason that this type of administration
could be adopted for the CAA.224 The result of the pBACT and
general permit process would be minimum requirements for state
and local building codes as part of each state’s SIP, and a FIP if a
state does not adopt a SIP with more energy efficient building
codes.225 States would be allowed to have more energy efficient
building codes, but would be forced to have building codes that
were at least as efficient as the standard code developed through
pBACT.
The EPA would then effectuate a two-tiered system for
issuing GHG permits. The first tier would include all of those
sources now regulated under the Tailoring Rule. The permit
process for those stationary sources would be unchanged from the
current process, and would regulate few sources.
The second tier would include smaller sources not currently
included under the Tailoring Rule, but subject to regulation
under the 100/250 tpy threshold. All of these emitters would be
regulated with general permits. These permits would include
building codes, which include requirements for energy efficiency
of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, as
well as insulation and design requirements.226
The possible use of building codes to regulate GHG emissions
suggests that the EPA has greatly overstated the administrative
burdens of having smaller emitters comply with the plain
language of the CAA. Buildings that emit below the thresholds
contemplated by the Tailoring Rule could all be required to have
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL, supra note 180, at B.6.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006).
See discussion supra Part IV.b.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
See BUILDING ENERGY CODES, supra note 214, at 5.
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general permits. This could be done in a fashion that does not
increase the administrative burden on most states and localities
because most state and local governments already have energy
efficiency standards as part of their building codes.227 In general,
new buildings and major renovations require building permits,
and those permits have energy efficiency requirements.228
Furthermore, most CAA enforcement is already at the state
level.229 A general permit could be nothing more than an
additional page on an electronic building permit that can be sent
to state environmental agencies and the federal EPA, noting that
a building is being built or rebuilt to federal energy standards
with federally approved appliances. The federal EPA would not
have to approve the permits, and state agencies would not have to
approve additional permits.
c. Selecting a Building Code
The use of building codes requires (1) selecting or writing an
energy efficient building code and (2) selecting codes for new and
existing buildings. Current building codes cover new buildings
and major modifications. New buildings emitting more than
100/250 tpy CO2e would be subject to national building energy
efficiency standards through EPA approval of SIPs. States could
also develop plans under their SIPs to encourage owners of
existing buildings to weatherize their buildings and increase
energy efficiency subject to another type of building code. The
EPA, other organizations, and agencies (especially the
Department of Energy) would likely collaborate and develop an
energy efficiency code for existing buildings.
This collaboration is analogous to regulation of GHG
emissions from cars and trucks (mobile sources). In regulating
mobile sources for GHG emissions, the EPA partnered with the
Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop higher mileage

227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gases, EPA, http://www.epa.
gov/nsr/ghgpermitting.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
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standards for mobile sources.230 The EPA would probably do the
same and work with DOE to develop minimum standards for
large buildings. Most of the work is already completed, so EPA
could just borrow that work to promulgate new national
minimum standards for large buildings.
Selecting a building code would rely, at least in part, on
EPA’s current five step process for BACT: (1) identify all
available control technologies; (2) eliminate technically infeasible
options; (3) evaluate and rank the remaining technologies based
on environmental effectiveness; (4) evaluate the cost-effectiveness
of controls after considering energy and other environmental
impacts; and (5) select BACT.231
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has a Building
Energy Codes Program (BECP) to develop more energy efficient
building codes.232 The BECP works with the International Code
Council (ICC), the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating,
and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), the Illuminating
Engineering Society of North America (IESNA), American
Institute of Architects (AIA), the building industry, and state and
local officials to develop and promote more stringent and easy-tounderstand building energy codes and to assess potential code
barriers to new energy efficient technologies.233
DOE’s work on building energy codes was established by the
Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976 (ECPA).234
ECPA established requirements for the development and
implementation of performance standards for all new residential
and commercial buildings.235 BECP was funded in 1993 in
response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which mandated that
DOE participate in the model national codes development process
230. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40506, CARS, TRUCKS,
CLIMATE: EPA REGULATION OF GREENHOUSE GASES FROM MOBILE SOURCES 17
(2010), available at http://crs.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/10Oct/R40506.pdf.
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006).
232. About Building Energy Codes, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.energy
codes.gov/about/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
233. See Development, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.energycodes.gov/
development/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
234. Energy Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat.
1125 (1976).
235. Id.
AND
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and that DOE help states adopt and implement progressive
energy codes.236 DOE does energy and cost analysis throughout
the code change proposal process, which fits with the costefficiency requirements of BACT.
EPA and DOE would have to partner to determine or develop
a building code for new and existing buildings that conforms to
BACT. This could be a multiyear process; so for the present, EPA
should require that states adopt and enforce the most recent
International Energy Conservation Code, released in 2012.237 A
similar process would be necessary for developing energy
efficiency codes for existing buildings.
In setting energy efficiency codes for existing buildings, the
United States should look to other countries’ energy efficiency
programs. There has been only limited development toward
widespread, mandatory requirements for existing buildings.238 In
general, countries have increased energy efficiency requirements
for new buildings, and used information (Energy Performance
Certificates) and fiscal incentives to improve energy efficiency in
existing buildings. 239
The two primary baseline building energy efficiency codes are
the International Energy Conservation Code (IECC) and the
ANSI/ASHRAE/IESNA Standard 90.1 Energy Standard for
Buildings Except Low-Rise Residential Buildings.240 The “IECC
addresses all residential and commercial buildings. ASHRAE
90.1 covers commercial buildings, defined as buildings other than
single-family dwellings and multi-family buildings three stories
or less above grade.”241 The IECC adopted, by reference,

236. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776.
237. INT’L CODE COUNCIL, 2012 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY CONSERVATION CODE
(2012).
238. BLAIR HAMILTON, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, A COMPARISON OF
ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS FOR EXISTING HOMES IN ELEVEN COUNTRIES 5
(2010), http://www.raponline.org/docs/RAP_Hamilton_ComparisonOfEEProgram
mesForExistingHomesInElevenCountries_2010_02_19.pdf.
239. Council Directive 2002/91, art. 7, 2002 O.J. (L 1) 65, 68 (EU) (requiring
Energy Performance Certificates in the European Union).
240. BUILDING ENERGY CODES, supra note 214, at 5.
241. Id.
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ASHRAE 90.1–“compliance with ASHRAE 90.1 qualifies as
compliance with IECC for commercial buildings.”242
The “IECC is developed under the auspices of the ICC using
a government consensus process. Per this process, all interested
parties may participate, but the final vote . . . is made by
individuals associated with federal, state, and local governments
who are also members of the ICC.”243 ICC codes are updated
every three years; the most recent was released in 2012. Since
“the IECC is written in mandatory, enforceable language, state
and local jurisdictions can easily adopt, implement, and enforce
the IECC as their energy code.”244
States vary greatly in their adoption of IECC building codes,
but most states have at least some adoption of such codes,
making it a good candidate for adoption nationwide. Currently,
39 states have standards that are at or above the 2009
standards.245 However, most states only adopted these standards
at the urge of the federal government. In 2009, the Department
of Energy stipulated that any state receiving funding from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s State Energy
Program had to meet the 2009 IECC and ASHRAE standards.246
This was effective as a majority of states updated their codes; in
2008, only 18% of states had updated their residential codes and
12% had implemented or upgraded their commercial codes.247
This suggests that most states will not update their energy
efficiency codes unless the federal government gives them an
incentive to do so.
California is an important exception because it has long had
by far the strictest energy efficiency requirements. In 1978,
California adopted Title 24, “a set of high-efficiency standards
dictating energy-saving requirements for walls, roofs, windows,

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Status of State Energy Code Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www
.energycodes.gov/adoption/states (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
246. Linda Baker, Reconstructing Building Codes for Greater Energy
Efficiency, GOVERNING (May 2011), http://www.governing.com/topics/energy-env/
reconstructing-building-codes-greater-energy-efficiency.html.
247. Id.
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insulation, heating, water heating, lighting, and ventilating and
air conditioning systems.”248 “Along with mandates for energyefficient appliances, the Title 24 standards have saved
Californians more than $56 billion in electrical and natural gas
expenses” over the last thirty years, which greatly outweighs
increases in buildings costs caused by more energy efficient
codes.249 “Although per capita electricity use in the U.S. has
increased by nearly 50% since the mid-1970s,” California’s per
capita electricity use has remained almost constant.250
The 2012 ASHRAE and ICC building energy codes have
learned from California’s experience and are about 30% more
efficient than the 2006 codes.251 This is by far the largest
increase in efficiency in the history of the codes, and will actually
be about 12% more efficient than California’s code.252 Among
major changes to the code are “lighting that shuts off
automatically in commercial buildings; minimum energy
performance standards for heating systems in computer rooms;
and more efficient water-cooled air conditioners.”253
An application of BACT to buildings would require that
states adopt codes at least as stringent as the 2012 ASHRAE and
ICC building codes for buildings that emit more than the 100/250
tpy threshold of CO2e. Since DOE conducts cost-benefit analyses
on building codes, such analyses can be made to conform to the
BACT process.

248. Id.; see also California Building Code, Title 24 (2010).
249. Baker, supra note 246.
250. Id.
251. Id.; FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, BENCHMARKING STANDARDS, MODEL CODES,
CODE AND VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE HERS INDEX, https://www.fas.org/
programs/energy/btech/policy/Benchmarking%20standards%20and%20model%2
0codes.pdf.
252. Stephen Selkowitz, Int’l Energy Agency, Overview of U.S. Building
Regulations (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.slideshare.net/internationalenergy
agency/16-selkowitz; ARCHITECTURE 2030, MEETING THE 2030 CHALLENGE
THROUGH BUILDING CODES 4 (2008) (showing that California 2008 building code,
effective 2010, is not as energy efficient as 2012 code described in Selkowitz).
253. Baker, supra note 246.
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V. USING BUILDING CODES TO REGULATE GHG
EMISSIONS UNDER THE CAA IS GOOD POLICY
Buildings consume 70% of the electricity in the United
States, and result in 39% of total carbon dioxide emissions.254
Building emissions in the United States are 8% of the world’s
total emissions.255 The Department of Energy has released a
report entitled Building Energy Codes 101: An Introduction that
discusses these issues at length.256 Building Codes 101 discusses:
(1) “[b]enefits in terms of the current energy, economic, and
environmental challenges facing our world today;” (2)
“[c]hallenges in terms of adoption, implementation, compliance,
and enforcement;” (3) “[d]evelopment processes led by the
International Code Council (ICC) and the American Society of
Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers
(ASHRAE);” (4) “[a]doption and incorporation into building design
and construction by states and jurisdictions;” and (5)
“[e]nforcement at the state and local level.”257
According to DOE, “[r]ecent research shows that if the 2006
International Energy
Conservation
Code
(IECC)
and
ANSI/ASHRAE/IESNA Standard 90.1-2004 were upgraded to be
30 to 50 percent more stringent, adopted among states, and
effectively implemented, significant benefits would be gained in
terms of energy consumption, cost savings, and [carbon dioxide]
emissions reduction.”258 Note again that the 2012 IECC is 30%
more energy efficient than the 2006 IECC.259 By 2030, the effects
of improved residential and commercial building codes would
reduce building energy use by 3.5 quadrillion Btu.260 This is
equivalent to power generated by 260 medium-sized (450-MW)
power plants.261 By 2030, total annual savings to building
owners would be $30 billion.262 “Even accounting for the
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

BUILDING ENERGY CODES, supra note 214, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Baker, supra note 246.
BUILDING ENERGY CODES, supra note 214, at 3.
Id.
Id.
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increased investment cost of the measures, the net benefits to the
nation are large.”263 “Transforming the building sector to employ
more energy-efficient designs, equipment, and solar power could
cut projected overall household energy expenses in 2030 from
$285 billion to $130 billion.”264 Failing to transform the building
sector “will raise the cost of meeting long-term climate goals by at
least $500 billion per year,” as more expensive means would have
to be used to reduce carbon emissions.265
Others have found that the United States economy provides
tremendous opportunities for net present value (NPV) positive
increases in energy efficiency.266 In 2009, McKinsey found that
an investment of $520 billion in energy efficiency would unlock
energy efficiency gains of $1.2 trillion, both in NPV terms.267
In its report, McKinsey found many barriers to investment in
energy efficiency. These barriers include:
● Agency (incentives split between parties, impeding capture
of potential),
● Ownership transfer (owner expects to leave before payback
time),
● Transaction barriers (unquantifiable incidental costs of
deployment),
● Pricing distortions (by regulatory, tax, or others distortions);
● Risk and uncertainty (about ability to capture benefit of the
investment),
● Lack of awareness/information (about product efficiency and
own consumption behavior),
● Custom and habit (practices that prevent capture of
potential),
● Elevated hurdle rate (similar options treated differently);
● Adverse bundling (combining efficiency savings with costly
options),
● Capital constraints (inability to raise initial outlay),
● Product availability (insufficient supply or channels to
market), and
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL ENERGY AND MATERIALS,
UNLOCKING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 3 (2009).
267. Id. at xii.
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All of these barriers to the proper realization of energy efficiency
suggest that government intervention is needed.269 Agency and
ownership transfer problems are especially severe. Energy
efficiency is difficult to measure, and therefore it is difficult to
effectively capitalize the value of it into rent or property values.
For a rented property, a landlord has little market incentive to
increase energy efficiency in his rented property because he
cannot gain the full value of increased rent from his investment.
Property owner-occupiers will be reluctant to invest in energy
efficiency because they may not be around to gain the full benefits
of the investment, and they will likely not receive the full value of
the investment into energy efficiency when they sell the property.
Government intervention solves these problems because all
building owners are forced to invest in energy efficiency.
Everyone then pays for less energy, and there is less
environmental degradation.
Adopting stricter building and
appliance codes would save money, not including the
environmental benefits from reducing pollution from mining and
burning fossil fuels (which provide most of our energy). The
national implementation of stricter building and appliance codes
would be cost-effective if climate change did not exist. The
existence of climate change makes the national implementation of
stricter building and appliance codes even more pressing.
Regulating building codes under the CAA would also solve
major problems with building code implementation. Currently,
adoption of stricter building codes as they are developed is not
automatic in most states.270 Requirement of BACT for larger
buildings would make this automatic, as the new building codes
would be considered part of SIPs that must be enforced by the
state. Furthermore, since all jurisdictions would have high
energy efficiency standards for large buildings, most builders
would be able to deliver high energy efficiency standards. There
would still be the challenges of implementation, compliance, and
268. Id. at ix.
269. Id. at 70.
270. BUILDING ENERGY CODES, supra note 214, at 3.
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enforcement, but these problems currently exist and would not
likely be exacerbated by stricter building codes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In 2009, the EPA found that GHGs endanger public health
and welfare, responding to Mass v. EPA (2007). The EPA started
regulating GHGs by regulating mobile sources, and then moved
to regulate stationary sources.
Regulation of GHGs under the CAA is difficult; the CAA was
certainly not written with GHGs in mind. Most air pollutants are
emitted in such small quantities that only very large sources (like
power plants and large industrial facilities) require permits. In
contrast, carbon dioxide is emitted in such large quantities that
most commercial, industrial, and large multifamily residential
buildings emit more than 100/250 tpy and require permits under
the plain language of the CAA. Instead of hundreds of permits
per year, EPA would have to issue millions of permits.
The plain language of the CAA states that the EPA must
regulate sources emitting more than 100/250 tpy of any regulated
air pollutant.
However, permits require BACT, which is
supposed to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The EPA
cannot regulate millions of sources on a case-by-case basis. In the
Tailoring Rule, the EPA chose to limit GHG regulation to sources
emitting more than 75,000/100,000 tpy CO2e.
The EPA justified the Tailoring Rule’s departure from the
plain language of the CAA with three doctrines: (1) absurd
results, (2) administrative necessity, and (3) one-step-at-a-time.
None of these three doctrines adequately justify the Tailoring
Rule, and therefore it will likely be overturned based on Chevron
if the D.C. Circuit reaches the merits of the case.
The best way to regulate smaller major sources for GHG
emissions is by using building codes. Precedent and the language
of the CAA suggest that forcing states to adopt and enforce more
energy efficient building codes through their SIPs to reduce GHG
emissions would be a permissible reading of the CAA.
While regulating smaller major sources provides some
difficulties (like how to regulate existing buildings), forcing
building owners to increase the energy efficiency of new and
existing buildings is cost-effective, even disregarding positive
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effects on the environment. Market failures prevent the full
realization of energy efficiency.
Federal government
intervention, as required by the CAA, could appropriately
incentivize state and local governments to include high levels of
energy efficiency in their building codes.
The Tailoring Rule is unlawful and thwarts national progress
in energy efficiency. It should be replaced, and we should
embrace the challenge of using the CAA and more energy efficient
building codes to regulate GHGs and move towards a cleaner,
greener future.
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